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I. THE ATTEMPT TO REVISE ARTICLE TWO
I can easily summarize the modern attempt to revise Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (“UCC”):
In an attempt to lessen the legal burdens on the sellers of mass-produced
goods, the proposed amendments to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) set out a single statutory standard for the responsibility of sellers that direct advertisements to the ultimate buyer of the goods. Generally consistent with
the existing case law, the new rule eliminated the problems sellers had in dealing
with the differences in this area among the various state laws. The provision was
manufacturer friendly. How did the manufacturing industry react to this helpful
amendment? They opposed it.1
1. Henry Gabriel, Uniform Commercial Code Article Two Revisions: the View of the Trenches, 23
BARRY L. REV. 129, 129 (2018) (citing Nat’l Assn. of Mfrs., Industry Concerns About Final Article 2 Revisions
(2005) (on file with author)).
The reason articulated by the National Association of Manufacturers was that:
The new rule is a major change that conflicts with the direction of most recent court and legislative action. It
creates liability for public communications, even though the communication was not a part of the agreement
and even if it did not cause personal injury. The rule may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. In
any event, this is a contract statute and should deal with contracts. This rule is a huge step backward that invites
class action litigation and is outside the domain of a commercial contract law. Id.
It may be that some did not fully appreciate the limited and clarifying purpose of this section. It is well explained in a report of the UCC Committee of the California State Bar which wrote a detailed response to the
memo from the National Association of Manufacturers:
A majority of state courts that have ruled on the issue have held that statements contained in brochures, catalogs
and other advertisements could create a basis for an express warranty under [e]xisting UCC [s]ection 2-313.
Many states have also held that privity is not required in order for an express warranty to be asserted. Furthermore, largely, the absence of privity is either effectively conceded, or not raised, in such litigation. To the extent
a state has adopted these rules, [a]mended UCC [section] 2-313B codifies these rules, and does not create any
new liability (indeed, it might even serve in some jurisdictions to limit liability that might exist by virtue of prior court decisions). In a state which has not adopted these rules, [a]mended UCC [section] 2-313B may create a
new potential liability for sellers in that state. One of the goals of the UCC is to promote commerce through a
uniform set of rules governing commercial transactions in all states. This not only protects customers, but also
creates a level playing field among competing sellers. Thus, when different states have different rules, it is a
necessary and desirable outcome that, when a uniform rule is adopted, the rule in some states will change.
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After 24 years of effort that ended with substantial organized opposition, the
Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”)2 lost the will to move forward with the enactment of the revisions to Article 2, and the revisions were officially withdrawn
in 2011.3
The proposed revisions of Article 2 of the UCC began in 1987 when the Permanent Editorial Board (“PEB”) for the UCC, in conjunction with the sponsors,
appointed a study group and charged it with identifying major problems of practical importance in the interpretation and application of Article 2.4 The drafting
process began in 1991 with the original drafting committee.5 The original drafting
committee was disbanded in 1999, and the second drafting committee was appointed.6 This second drafting committee worked for four years from 1999 until
2003. The completed revisions sat unenacted anywhere, and out of an appreciation that there was no future for the revisions, the ULC and the American Law
Institute (“ALI”) officially withdrew the revisions in 2011.7
To salvage some of the work undertaken with the proposed revisions to Article 2, the PEB decided to reexamine the revisions in 2019 to see if any of the proposals might warrant PEB Commentary for future guidance to understand how
Article 2 has developed over time. In this paper, I examine some of the proposed
revisions and discuss how some of the proposed revisions to Article 2 might be
addressed in PEB Commentary to achieve some of the clarifications the drafters
had envisioned.
What, of course, needs to be decided is the proper use of PEB commentary.
Certainly, it should not be used to suggest correction to every perceived misapplication of the UCC. For the commentary to be effective, it should probably be
drafted sparingly. How important must an issue be to warrant the concern of the
PEB to justify new commentary? This question goes to both the perceived need
for the commentary as well as the question of how to allocate the limited resources available to the PEB. These are questions I cannot resolve in this article,
and I will not attempt to do so. The limited scope of this Article is to articulate

Unif. Commercial Code Comm., Analysis by the UCC Committee of the State Bar of California Business Law
Section of the NAM Industry Concerns About the UCC Article 2 Revisions 4, 2005 STATE BAR OF CAL. BUS. L.
SEC. (footnotes omitted). I will discuss below how this might be partially addressed with P.E.B commentary.
2. The official name of the organization is the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
3. Recommendation of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code to withdraw
the 2003 Amendments to UCC Articles 2 and 2A from the Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code, 65
Consumer Fin. L. Q. Rep. 150, 160–61 (2011). [hereinafter Recommendation of PEB]
4. See generally Preliminary Report, PEB Study Group Uniform Commercial Code Article 2, Permanent
Editorial Bd. for the Unif. Com. Code (1990); PEB Study Group: Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 Executive Summary, 46 BUS. LAW. 1869 (1991) (providing a concise summary of the PEB preliminary report).
5. Henry Deeb Gabriel, The 2003 Amendments of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: Eight
Years or a Lifetime After Completion, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 487, 490 (2011).
6. Id. at 491.
7. See Recommendation of PEB, supra note 3, at 161. The history of the attempt to revise UCC Article 2
has been well documented by me and others; it need not be repeated here. See, e.g., Id. at 493.
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those parts of the failed revision to Article 2 of the UCC that might warrant consideration by the PEB. It is up to the PEB itself to decide whether any of these
suggestions merit further consideration.
There are two distinct drafts of revised Article 2: the 1999 draft and the 2003
draft.8 Only the latter was approved by the ULC and the ALI for adoption by the
states. Although one might fruitfully mine the 1999 draft for suggestions for PEB
commentary, in this Article I limit the discussion to the draft proposed 2003 revisions to Article 2. This limitation is suggested by the nature of the two drafts
themselves. Unlike the proposed 1999 revision, which sought to revise all of Article 2, the 2003 amendments were much more modest. They proposed a set of discrete changes, rather than a thoroughgoing revision. The changes suggested in the
2003 draft were designed to clarify ambiguities in the existing Code; to update Article 2 considering modern commercial practices, in particular electronic commerce; and in a few places, to place in the black-letter text of what developed in
the case law. These are precisely the limited types of changes that might be fruitfully clarified by PEB commentary.
During the drafting of the 2003 revisions, the “revisions” to Article 2 became
the “amendments” to Article 2 because of a procedural requirement of uniform
acts drafted by the ULC. A total revision of a uniform act is in effect a new uniform act, and as such, is subject to the full drafting process of a uniform act. This
includes conforming the entire act to the current drafting rules of the conference.
A revision of Article 2 would have entailed some change to most sections—
however minimal—to conform with the current drafting rules. Amendments to existing acts do not require this. Thus, to avoid making non-substantive but stylistic
changes to Article 2, the “revisions” were re-designated “amendments.” The
drafters made this change to avoid the criticism that the drafters were making unnecessary changes. For purposes of consistency, I will refer to the proposed
changes as amendments, as this is how they are commonly known.
II.THE PEB
This Article focuses on the possible commentary by the PEB of the Uniform
Commercial Code. The PEB acts under the authority of the ALI and the ULC (also known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
These two organizations jointly sponsor the UCC.

8. The proposed revisions of Article 2 of the UCC began in 1987 when the PEB for the UCC, in conjunction with the sponsors, appointed a study group and charged it with identifying major problems of practical importance in the interpretation and application of Article 2. The drafting process began in 1991 with the original
drafting committee. That drafting committee was disbanded in 1999, and the second drafting committee was
appointed. This second drafting committee worked for four years from 1999 until 2003. It is the draft from the
second drafting committee that is discussed in this article. These revisions sat unenacted anywhere until 2011.
Out of an appreciation that there was no future for the revisions, The Uniform Law Commission and the American Law Institute officially withdrew the revisions that year.
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Founded by a resolution between the two organizations in March 1987, the
PEB resolved to issue from time to time supplementary commentary on the UCC
to be known as PEB Commentary. These PEB Commentaries are intended to further the underlying policies of the UCC by affording guidance in interpreting and
resolving issues raised by the UCC and its Official Comments.
The Resolution states that:
A PEB Commentary should come within one or more of the following
specific purposes, which should be made apparent at the inception of the
Commentary: (1) to resolve an ambiguity in the Uniform Commercial
Code by restating more clearly what the PEB considers to be the legal
rule; (2) to state a preferred resolution of an issue on which judicial opinion or scholarly writing diverges; (3) to elaborate on the application of
the Uniform Commercial Code where the statute and/or the Official
Comment leaves doubt as to inclusion or exclusion of, or application to,
particular circumstances or transactions; (4) consistent with U.C.C. § 1102(2)(b), to apply the principles of the Uniform Commercial Code to
new or changed circumstances; (5) to clarify or elaborate upon the operation of the Uniform Commercial Code as it relates to other statutes (such
as the Bankruptcy Code and various federal and state consumer protection statutes) and general principles of law and equity pursuant to
U.C.C.§ 1-103; or (6) to otherwise improve the operation of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
As of December 2019, the PEB has issued twenty commentaries.
III. POSSIBLE PEB COMMENTARY TO CLARIFY THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 2
A. Scope
There were three proposed changes to the scope of Article 2. Two were uncontroversial and I suggest can easily be dealt with by clarifying commentary.
1. Relation of Article 2 with Other Law
First, there was a proposed new section that clarifies the relationship of Article 2 to other law. 9 This section copied existing UCC § 2A-104(1) and did not

9. This is contained in U.C.C. § 2-108 (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011):
(1) A transaction subject to this article is also subject to any applicable:
(a) [list any certificate of title statutes of this State covering automobiles, trailers, mobile homes, boats, farm
tractors, or the like], except with respect to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course of business under Section 2
403(2) which arise before a certificate of title covering the goods is effective in the name of any other buyer;
(b) rule of law that establishes a different rule for consumers; or
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create any new substantive rules. This new provision was uncontroversial and
served the function of clarifying the relationship between Article 2 and other possible applicable law. A short commentary pointing out that, as with Article 2A,
Article 2 must necessarily work with other law could be useful. One objection
might be that the proposed section to Article 2, and therefore PEB commentary,
is unnecessary as it is already generally understood that Article 2 must work in
conjunction with other law.10 What this clarification may achieve though, is to
provide guidance about the priority between these laws and Article 2 when both
may be applicable.
Would this be an inappropriate attempt to create by non-binding commentary
a legal result that should more appropriately be done by binding statute as it does
in fact attempt to create binding and not merely suggested law? This should be a
concern. If there is PEB commentary on the relationship of Article 2 and other
law, I suggest that to the extent that language and intent of Article 2A is the same
as Article 2, the two Articles should be interpreted similarly.
2. Foreign Exchange Transaction
A second proposal in the revisions to limit the scope of Article 2 was the express exclusion from the definition of goods for a “foreign exchange transaction.”11 This exclusion was meant to clarify what should be evident from Article

(c) statute of this State to which the transaction is subject, such as statutes dealing with:
(i) the sale or lease of agricultural products;
(ii) the transfer of blood, blood products, human tissues, or parts;
(iii) the consignment or transfer by artists of works of art or fine prints;
(iv) distribution agreements, franchises, and other relationships through which goods are sold;
(v) the misbranding or adulteration of food products or drugs; and
(vi) dealers in particular products, such as automobiles, motorized wheelchairs, agricultural equipment, and
hearing aids.
(2) Except for the rights of a buyer in ordinary course of business under subsection (1) (a), in the event of a conflict between this article and a law referred to in subsection (1), that law governs.
(3) For purposes of this article, failure to comply with a law referred to in subsection (1) has only the effect
specified in that law.
(4) This article modifies, limits, and supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq., except that nothing in this article modifies, limits, and supersedes
the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq., except
that nothing in this article modifies, limits, or supersedes Section 7001(c) of that Act or authorizes electronic
delivery of any of the notices described in Section 7003(b) of that Act.
10. U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(3), (b).
11. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(i) (amended 2005) (withdrawn 2011):
“Foreign exchange transaction” means a transaction in which one party agrees to deliver a quantity of a specified money or unit of account in consideration of the other party’s agreement to deliver another quantity of different money or unit of account either currently or at a future date, and in which delivery is to be through funds
transfer, book entry accounting, or other form of payment order, or other agreed means to transfer a credit balance. The term includes a transaction of this type involving multiple moneys and spot, forward, option, or other
products derived from underlying moneys and any combination of these transactions. The term does not include
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2 itself: the definition of “goods” does not include the transfer of an intangible
such as a monetary credit. This clarification would not change the existing law
and therefore could easily be provided for in PEB commentary. 12
3. Relationship Between Article 2 and Computer Software
A third—and the most controversial—proposed change to the scope of Article 2 was the question of whether computer software was within or outside the
scope of Article 2.13 This singly was the most controversial issue in the revisions,
and this issue alone may have been the most significant reason for the failure of
the adoption of the revisions. There was never an agreement on this issue, and no
amount of compromise was ever found. I can think of no useful PEB commentary on this issue.
It is worth noting that some of the questions raised in the discussion in the
drafting of the revisions have been addressed in the American Law Institute’s
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS.14 Whether this Restatement
a transaction involving multiple moneys in which one or both of the parties is obligated to make physical delivery, at the time of contracting or in the future, of banknotes, coins, or other form of legal tender or specie.
12. One objection to proposed PEB commentary is whether this issue is one worth bothering with. If
there is too much commentary on insignificant matters, the effectiveness of the PEB commentary may well be
diminished.
13. The drafting committee attempted to resolve the problem by defining computer software as “information” and then removing information from the definition of “goods”. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(k) cmt. 7 (amended
2005) (withdrawn 2011). As for pure software transactions, this at least drew a coherent bright line to exclude
some transactions from Article 2; albeit, this did not satisfy those who thought the protections of Article 2
should be imported into software transactions. What the draft did not do—because we could not figure out
how—was to give clear guidance for the application of Article 2 to mixed contracts, those contracts that include
both goods and software. This lack of guidance appeared to please no one but the beleaguered reporter and chair
of the drafting committee.
Because no compromise could be found, this question of mixed goods and information contracts was left unresolved in the revision. A major concern expressed by the software industry was that by not resolving the question in the Code, we were tacitly approving the existing case law. Largely, the cases brought software within the
scope Article 2, and therefore provided software users with article 2 warranty and other protections. The software industry thought these Article 2 protections did not accurately reflect the true nature of a software agreement, and therefore the industry was not content with this result, and because of this, balk at the whole package
of amendments. This, along with some other unhappy industry commentators, moved the revisions to the dustbin of statutory amendments.
14. In 2004, a year after the amendments were completed and approved, the ALI began a project called
the Principles of the Law of Software Contracts. This project, completed and approved by the ALI in May 2009,
sets out basic principles to govern software contracts, irrespective of whether the parties call their transaction a
license, sale, lease, or something else. The Principles are designed to set out rules that transcend Article 2,
UCITA, or the common law, and thereby avoid the question of which of these laws would govern. The clear
intent of the Principles is to fill in the gap left by Article 2 as to when a software agreement is covered by the
UCC. See AM. LAW INST., Introduction to PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS (2010).
Not surprisingly, even before the Principles were promulgated, representatives of the software industry had already complained about them. One major complaint was that the standard of performance for software that the
Principles created extended warranty protection beyond what was provided for under the current Article 2. In a
letter to the ALI, Microsoft Corporation and the Linux Foundation note:
We have particular concerns with [section] 3.05(b), which establishes an implied warranty of no material hid-
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will have a significant impact on the development of the law is yet to be seen. As
the Restatement is not subject to the political process of statutory enactment as is
the case with the UCC, the Restatement can succeed or fail without raising the
political issues that are necessarily a part of the enactment of the UCC. This is a
concern that should not be sidestepped by the PEB by assuming that the Restatement can achieve the same result as PEB commentary.
B. Shipping and Delivery Terms
The delivery terms in the UCC have never reflected commercial practice outside, and to a large extent inside, the United States. Only in the UCC, for example,
does “free on board” not mean “on board.”15 In an attempt to conform Article 2 to
general commercial usage, the amendments eliminated the statutory shipping
terms for F.O.B., F.A.S., C.I.F., C. & F., ex-ship, and all cross-references to
those terms. Also eliminated were the provisions on overseas shipment, bills of
lading in a set, and a provision setting out the meaning of the “no arrival, no sale”
term. As statutorily defined in the Code, it was generally recognized that these
terms were outdated at best and, in some cases, inconsistent with generally accepted practices.16
The elimination of these terms recognized that parties did not rely on them,
and often would use more current and widely recognized shipping terms such as
the Incoterms.17 The drafting committee quite sensibly did not attempt to rewrite
the shipping terms in Article 2 to conform to current commercial practice, as the
committee quite correctly noted that the terms used in actual practice change over
time.18 By eliminating them from the UCC altogether, Article 2 would have allowed the parties by trade usage or express choice to set out shipping terms that

den defects that is non-disclaimable. This warranty does not reflect existing commercial law: no similar warranty appears in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and no explanation is given in the commentary for treating
software contracts differently from sale of goods [contracts] on this point.
The reporters of the Principle responded to this criticism by suggesting that this rule only states the existing law
of contracts. Whether this is true or not will continue to be debated. What is clear, however, is that the ALI has
picked up the discussion on what law governs software contracts where the amendments of Article 2 left off.
The debate on the Principles is just as heated as it was with the Article 2 amendments. It has yet to be seen what
effect this debate will have on the viability of the Principles. Thus far, only two cases have cited the Principles,
both from the time the Principles were still being drafted, so the utility of the Principles has yet to be shown.
See, e.g., Wong v. True Beginnings, LLC., No. 3:07-CV-1244-N, 2008 WL 11348237, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3,
2008); Conwell v. Grey Loon Outdoor Marketing Group, Inc., 906 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ind. 2009).
15. U.C.C. § 2-319.
16. The terms are also somewhat limited in their application, as they are limited to questions of risk of
loss, contract price and in some instances insurance, whereas the INCOTERMS, for example, also include the
risk of having to clear customs and arrange for import and export of the goods.
17. The INCOTERMS or International Commercial Terms are commercial terms published by the International Chamber of Commerce that are widely used in contracts of carriage.
18. The INCOTERMS, for example, are rewritten and reissued every ten years.
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reflect actual commercial practices and party expectations. 19
Although the elimination of the shipping terms would have brought the Code
in closer conformity with current business practices, since the Code’s terms are
generally superseded expressly or by trade practice, the terms’ continued presence in the Code is not likely to be significant. Having said that, there may be
some utility in a concise commentary noting the terms are often (if not usually)
superseded expressly or by trade usage.
C. Remedial Promises
A substantive change in the law of express warranties is the inclusion of
“remedial promises.”20 This addition was not intended to create any new rights,21
but to clarify the relationship between the remedial promise and the statute of
limitations.22 As recognized by the drafters of the amendments, sellers have
long made, and expect to comply with, remedial promises. The amendments were
intended neither to encourage nor discourage this practice by sellers. What was
intended by this addition was to provide a means to determine the limitations period for a remedial promise.23
To understand these proposed changes, one must appreciate that courts have
long had difficulty determining the appropriate limitation period for remedial
promises, in part due to the confusion of whether a remedial promise is a separate

19. The need for shipping terms in a statute for the sale of goods has not been shown to be necessary. For
example, neither the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Good nor the English
Sale of Goods Act contain shipping terms. See U.N. CONF. ON CONT. FOR THE INT’L SALE OF GOODS, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (1980); see also Sale of Goods Act (1979) c. 54 (U.K.).
20. A remedial promise, as defined in Amended § 2-103, is “a promise by the seller to repair or replace
goods or to refund. . .upon the happening of a specified event,” which distinguishes these promises about the
seller’s performance from promises about the performance of the goods. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(n) (amended 2005)
(withdrawn 2011).
21. Remedial promises have long been recognized in the law. See Magnuson Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(B) (2006).
22. The problem can be explained by looking at Nationwide Ins. Co. v. GMC, 625 A.2d 1172 (Pa. 1993).
In this case, the majority held that the remedial promise given to the buyer by General Motors was not an independent contractual obligation to repair but was an express warranty under Article 2 of the UCC. See id. at
1174–75. Having determined Article 2 governed the remedial promise, the court noted the statute of limitations,
as provided by § 2- 725, was four years from the time the buyer received the goods. See id. at 1175. Because
this created the anomaly that the statute of limitations was running even though neither the need to remedy the
defect nor the failure to remedy the defect had occurred, the court read the language of the promise to include a
promise of future performance, thereby extending the limitation period. See id. As pointed out by the defendant,
General Motors, the language in the agreement was not language normally interpreted as creating a guarantee of
future performance. See id. at 1176 & n.7. It may well have been the court knew this but chose to read the language in a way that forced the result of extending the statute of limitations. One basis the majority used for finding the remedial promise is an express warranty was that the language of the agreement used the term warranty
to describe the remedial promise. See id. at 1177. However, as set out in a dissent, this was language forced upon the seller by the federal Magnuson–Moss legislation and was intended to denote a federal Magnuson–Moss
“warranty,” (the language the federal Act uses for remedial promises) and not as a UCC express warranty. See
id. at 1180–81 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
23. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(n) & preliminary official comment (9) (amended 2005) (withdrawn 2011).
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contractual obligation from the contract for sale or whether it is an Article 2 express warranty. Since a breach of the remedial promise would appear to occur
when the obligation to remedy the defect has arisen, it makes sense to begin the
limitation period at that time. Yet, under § 2-725, if the remedial promise is considered part of the Article 2 warranty and remedy scheme, the limitation period
begins to run when the tender of delivery is made. This point in time, though, has
no real connection to the actual breach of the remedial promise.
Courts have responded to this problem in three ways. First, they have found
that the four-year statute of limitations runs from the time the goods are tendered,
irrespective of when the remedial promise is not met.24 Second, some courts have
treated the remedial promise as a separate contractual obligation, with the statute
of limitations beginning when the remedial promise is not met.25 A third line of
cases has used a creative interpretation of the language of the remedial promise
to find that it provides for “future performance” and therefore extends the beginning of the limitation period.26
To avoid these disparate interpretations and results, the amendments set out a
two-step process to harmonize and rationalize the statute of limitations for remedial promises. First, the amendments make a remedial promise an express warranty
under Article 2.27 This removes the question of whether a remedial promise
should be treated as a separate contractual obligation. Second, the amendments
change the statute of limitations to provide that the limitation period for a remedial promise begins “when the remedial promise is not performed when performance is due.”28
Because the amendments to the express warranty provisions were designed
to clear up nonuniformity in the cases, the failure to adopt these provisions has
resulted in the continued nonuniformity and inconsistent interpretation of warranty language. But the purpose of these proposed changes to the sections on express
warranties and statute of limitations was an attempt to force by statute a result
that could have (and often were) correctly found by case law. What the PEB
could do is provide guidance on the means to distinguish remedial promises from
Article 2 remedy limitations, and by doing so unravel the statute of limitations
problems that tangle up some courts and let sellers avoid the obligations they
clearly have undertaken to remediate defective products.

24. See, e.g., Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 544 So.2d 883, 891 (Ala. 1989).
25. See, e.g., Brown v. GMC, 14 So.3d 104, 113 (Ala. 2009).
26. See, e.g., Docteroff v. Barra Corp. of Am., Inc., 659 A.2d 948, 954–55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1995); R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 1983). There are, of
course, some express warranties that do promise future performance, and therefore do invoke the extended limitation period. See Joswick v. Chesapeake Mobile Homes, Inc., 765 A.2d 90, 96–97 (Md. 2001). The cases that
concerned the drafting committee were those where the language of the express warranty does not expressly
promise future performance. See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. v. GMC, 625 A.2d at 1175–76 (Pa. 1993).
27. U.C.C. § 2-313(4) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
28. U.C.C. § 2-725(2)(c) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
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IV. PROPOSED CHANGES PREEMPTED BY SUBSEQUENT WORK BY THE ULC AND
ALI
A. Electronic Contracting
The amendments provided for electronic contracting, at least to the extent
that it provided for the electronic equivalents of writings and signatures and attribution rules for these electronic equivalences. 29 These provisions were hardly
exceptional at the time the amendments were drafted and are wholly unnecessary
today because the application of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(UETA),30 which has been adopted in forty-nine jurisdictions, provides essentially the same rules. 31
To the extent there are further changes necessary to accommodate Article 2
to modern electronic commercial practice, there is presently a new joint
ULC/ALI committee studying the entire UCC to determine what effect emerging
technologies may have on the Code.32 The work of that committee is likely to address any technology issues that might otherwise warrant commentary by the
PEB.
V. PROPOSALS TO THE BLACK LETTER STATUTE WHERE THE COURTS USUALLY
GET IT CORRECT
A. Warranties of Title and Noninfringement
The amendments moved from the comments into the black-letter text the
proviso that the warranty of title is breached if it “unreasonably expose[s] the
buyer to litigation . . . because of any colorable claim to or interest in the
goods.”33 This not only conforms the text to the comments, 34 but also states what

29. The term “writing” was changed to “record” throughout the article. U.C.C., prefatory note (amended
2003) (withdrawn 2011). See U.C.C. § 2-103(m) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011). The definitions of sign and
conspicuous were changed to accommodate electronic communications, and new definitions for electronic,
electronic agent, and electronic record were added. U.C.C. § 2-103(b), (f), (g), (h), (m), (p), accompanying
cmts. (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011). Consistent with what has become universal principles of electronic
contracting, the amendments also provide substantive rules to govern electronic transactions. The amendments
also provided that a record, signature, or contract could not be denied legal effect and enforceability merely because it is electronic in form. U.C.C. § 2-211(1) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011). Also consistent with the
Uniform Electronic Transaction Act (UETA), the amendments provided an attribution rule. U.C.C. § 2-212 &
cmt. 1 (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
30. Uniform Electronic Transaction Act, cmt. 2 (1999).
31. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999).
32. See Uniform Commercial Code and Emerging Technologies Committee, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION
(2019),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=afffb337-d599-44569436-a52aa5d9dcc2.
33. U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(a) (amended 2003 ) (withdrawn 2011).
34. U.C.C. § 2-312, cmt. 1 (1962).
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had long been recognized by the courts.35 Because this result is already in the
comments, and as the courts have generally accepted this comment as correct,
there would appear to be no reason to provide for this by PEB commentary. 36
The amendments also clarified that not only can the warranty of title be disclaimed, but the warranty against infringement can be disclaimed as well. This
would have made explicit what is already available to the parties under general
freedom of contract. It would be a useful clarification of the obvious, but unnecessary as PEB commentary.
B. Cure
The amendments make a series of clarifying changes to § 2-508 on the seller’s right to cure. What would have appeared to be a total revision of the section
would have done little other than make explicit results that were already part of
Article 2.37 The amendments clarified that the right to cure would not be limited
to rejections of the goods, but also, in appropriate circumstances, when there was
a revocation of acceptance. This, however, should have been obvious from § 2608(3).38
The amendments also explicitly provided that the right to cure under § 2-612
in installment contracts would be governed by § 2-508.39 This has caused some
confusion in the cases, as it is not explicit in the text. 40 Yet a close reading of the
Code would have brought this conclusion. The amendments also provided explicitly that the seller would have to perform in good faith,41 but this requirement
should never have been in doubt, irrespective of this amendment. 42 The amendments also specifically provided that the cure must be of conforming goods and

35. See, e.g., Colton v. Decker, 540 N.W.2d 172, 176 (S.D. 1995).
36. Although I suggest that given the current acceptance by the courts, PEB commentary is not necessary, there probably is another reason to eschew PEB commentary on this point. The black letter text actually
contradicts the commentary. It is not clear that the PEB could give guidance to suggest courts should ignore the
black letter text in favor of the conflicting comments. This choice, I suggest, is properly and best left to the
courts.
37. The amendments did provide one limitation on the right to cure when there has been a revocation of
acceptance; the revisions limit this right to non-consumer contracts. See U.C.C. § 2-508 & cmt. 2 (amended
2003) (withdrawn 2011). This apparent victory for consumers could be easily contracted around by sellers, and
therefore would not have operated as a limitation to sellers unless the sellers did not change their form agreements to accommodate this.
38. U.C.C. § 2-608(3) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011) (“A buyer that so revokes has the same rights
and duties with regard to the goods involved as if the buyer had rejected them.”).
39. U.C.C. § 2-508(1)–(2) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011) (cure); U.C.C. § 2-612(1)–(3) (amended
2003) (withdrawn 2011) (installment contracts).
40. See, e.g., Midwest Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, L.L.C. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 965 F. Supp.
1003, 1011 & n.6 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
41. U.C.C. § 2-508(1) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
42. U.C.C. § 1-304 (imposing an obligation of good faith on all contracts under the UCC).
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must be at the seller’s expense. 43 But as with all of the clarifications in the
amended section on cure, all of these points should be obvious from Article 2,
and therefore probably do not warrant clarification by PEB commentary.
VI. CLARIFYING CHANGES IN THE REVISIONS THAT WILL GO UNNOTICED AND
NEEDS NO COMMENTARY
The amendments defined “repudiation.”44 The meaning of this term has never been in doubt, and the absence of this revision will go unnoticed.
The amendments provided a comprehensive index of seller and buyer remedies in §§ 2-703 and 2-711.45 This could be a useful tool to provide a quick list of
the available remedies, but it neither created nor eliminated any existing remedies. The absence of this revision will also go unnoticed.
VII. PROPOSALS TO THE BLACK LETTER STATUTE WHERE COMMENTARY COULD
ACHIEVE THE SAME RESULT
A. Clarifying Changes in the Revisions on Performance and Breach
As for performance and breach, the amendments made a series of clarifications to the Code. Amended § 2-612 on installment contracts would have provided that the test is whether the value of that installment to the buyer is substantially impaired.46 This is a clarification of less than clear language to provide for the
clear intent of this section. As this change was not intended to change the result of
the existing language, this clarification could easily be provided for by PEB commentary.
The amendments also expressly provided that a buyer’s reasonable use of the
goods post-rejection or post-revocation of acceptance is not an acceptance of the
goods, but that the buyer may be “obligated to the seller for the value of the use to
the buyer.”47 This change reflected what was considered by the drafting committee both as the correct result and the rule that most courts had adopted. Since this
proposed rule did not create or negate any existing obligations, but merely provided guidance on interpretation, this rule could be the basis for PEB commentary.
Amended § 2-615 was changed to note that the seller may have an excuse
under the doctrine of impracticability not only for delay in delivery or nondelivery, but also for delay in performance or non-performance. This change recognizes that delivery might not be the only obligation that a seller has and may
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

U.C.C. § 2-508(1) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
U.C.C. § 2-610(2) cmt. 2 (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
U.C.C. §§ 2-703, 2-711 (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
U.C.C. § 2-612(2) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
U.C.C. § 2-608(4)(b) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
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be unable to meet.48 This expands the scope of a seller’s defense of impracticability, and therefore is a substantive change to the statute that would generally not
be achievable by PEB commentary. One might, however, approach this issue by
noting that the common law would provide for this expansive use of the doctrine
of impracticability,49 and that the Code was not intended to limit the use of the
common law in this area.50
Not all proposed changes for the sections on performance and breach could
be achieved by PEB commentary. For example, §§ 2-602, 2-603 and 2-604 provide a notice requirement and obligations on a buyer that rightfully rejects goods.
The amendments would have extended these obligations to a buyer that wrongfully, as well as rightfully, rejected goods as long as the rejection was effective.
These changes are consistent with the underlying policy of party obligations in
the Code. Irrespective of the reason for and the rightfulness of a rejection, a seller
is entitled to the knowledge that the buyer has rejected the goods. In addition, the
reasons for placing a duty on the buyer to handle the goods on behalf of the seller
are equally applicable, whether the rejection has been rightful or not. Although
this has long been assumed the correct result under Article 2, it is not clear that
this does not impose different obligations that can be achieved without statutory
amendment.
B. Remedies
Amended § 2-702 explicitly pointed out that a good faith purchaser must
give value.51 This simply imports the common law requirement of having to give
value to have the protection of a good faith purchaser. Likewise, § 2-507(2) was
rewritten to make certain what is intended in the section is a right of reclamation
if the buyer does not pay for the goods.52 The amendments also expressly provided what was already implicit: the seller’s failure to resell in accord with § 2-706
does not bar other remedies.53 All of these points are consistent with the present
law and could easily be explained and clarified by PEB commentary.
The amendments also specify that non-consumer parties can contract for specific performance.54 But this is something that the courts have begun to
acknowledge the parties could do by contract irrespective of the Code. This line
of cases could also be affirmed by PEB commentary.
48. U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
49. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).
50. This is analogous to the court’s using the doctrine of frustration of purpose in Article 2 cases although the frustration is not provided for in the Code. See, e.g., Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cty.
Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 277–78 (7th Cir. 1986).
51. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
52. U.C.C. § 2-507(2) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
53. U.C.C. § 2-706(7) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
54. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
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VIII. WHERE THE AMENDMENTS WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE RESULT AND
CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY PEB COMMENTARY
A. Battle of the Forms
Probably the most significant proposed change to Article 2 was the total overhaul of § 2-207 on the battle of the forms.55 The proposed section is stark in its
analytical approach. Those terms that the parties have agreed upon, either expressly or by implication, are part of the agreement. No other terms are. The result of this is that the parties are only bound where there has been assent.
This contrasts greatly from either the common law or existing § 2-207—both
of which tend to force one party’s terms on the other party. 56 Moreover, because
of the inconsistencies in the official comments, 57 as well as differing court interpretations of the section,58 the current § 2-207 can be a nightmare to negotiate
through. This was the one section where the amendments truly were a major improvement from the existing law. It is interesting that the amendment of this section was contentious.59 I have never understood whether this was based on real
objections or whether it was just a reason to attack the amendments as a whole.
Irrespective, there does not seem to be any way one could use PEB commentary
to attempt to re-write the language and results of § 2-207.

55. U.C.C. § 2-207 (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011) provided:
If (i) conduct by both parties recognizes the existence of a contract although their records do not otherwise establish a contract, (ii) a contract is formed by an offer and acceptance, or (iii) a contract formed in any manner
is confirmed by a record that contains terms additional to or different from those in the contract being confirmed, the terms of the contract, subject to Section 2-202, are:
(a) terms that appear in the records of both parties;
(b) terms, whether in a record or not, to which both parties agree; and
(c) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of this Act.
56. See Henry D. Gabriel, The Battle of the Forms: A Comparison of the United Nations Convention for
the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 BUS. LAW. 1053, 1055, 1062 (1994).
57. See id. at 1059–60 & n.37.
58. See id. at 1060 & n.41.
59. The National Association of Manufacturers complained that the amendment to § 2-207 “creates confusion in contract formation.” Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., supra note 1. The UCC Committee of the
California State Bar responded to this rather astounding claim by noting that:
Under [e]xisting UCC [section] 2-207 there is a deference to the first writing. Amended UCC [section] 2-207
treats the varying terms on an evenhanded basis, removing this artificial deference to one writing over another.
Elimination of the arbitrary battle of the forms rule under [e]xisting UCC [section] 2-207 is a beneficial change.
Existing UCC [section] 2-207 has spawned expensive litigation over the years due to its lack of clarity. Amended UCC [section] 2-207 will eliminate unfair advantage, provide more clarity, and should lead to less litigation.
Analysis by the UCC Committee of the State Bar of California Business Law Section of the NAM Industry Concerns About the UCC Article 2 Revisions, supra note 1, at 4 (footnotes omitted).
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B. Statute of Frauds
The amendments raised the requirements for the statute of frauds from $500
to $5,000. The $500 amount in the current Article 2 comes from the 1906 version
of the Uniform Sales Act, 60 and the drafters felt that 100 years of inflation justified this change. Certainly, this change would have had some impact on the enforceability of contracts, but whether that impact would have been significant is
not clear. Given that parties routinely reduce non-electronic contracts to paper
along with the generous exceptions to the rule provided for under paragraphs two
and three of UCC § 2-201, the statute of frauds has not been a major source of
problems under the Code. Moreover, to the extent that the business world is rapidly moving toward electronic contracting, the statute of frauds will likely have
less significance in the future. Thus, the lack of this amendment will be a loss,
but not a significant one. It is certainly, however, not a change that can be made
without a change to the statute itself. The dollar amount of the statute of frauds is
not a candidate for PEB commentary.
Another proposed change to the statute of frauds was a pure policy choice.
The question of whether an action in promissory estoppel is subject to the statute of
frauds is neither clear from the text of the existing Code, nor the cases. Although many courts have determined that the statute of frauds does not apply because the statute only applies to contract actions, a substantial number of courts
have extended its reach to promissory estoppel cases. Usually, these decisions
have been ostensibly based on a textual reading of the statute. The justification of
applying the statute of frauds has been based on the first clause of § 2-201, which
provides “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section . . . .” It is therefore argued that all exceptions to the application of the statute of frauds are contained in
the section.61 The contrary argument has been statutorily gleaned from § 1-103(b),
which provides that the Code does not displace principles of estoppel.62 The drafters concluded that the statute of frauds should not be a bar to promissory estoppel
cases, and in doing so consciously overruled the line of cases that provided for
this. Although this clear direction is lost without the enactment of the amendments, this is an issue that could be resolved by PEB commentary.

60. UNIF. SALES ACT OF 1906 § 4(1) (amended 1948), reprinted in JOHN BARKER WAITE, THE LAW OF
SALES 288–89 (1921). The original Statute of Frauds applied to the sale of goods for £10 or more. See Statute of
Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 16 (Eng.) (1677).
61. See, e.g., Futch v. James River–Norwalk, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1395, 1402 (S.D. Miss. 1989); Renfroe
v. Ladd, 701 S.W.2d 148, 149–50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Golden Plains Feedlot, Inc. v. Great W. Sugar Co., 588
F. Supp. 985, 992–93 (D.S.D. 1984); Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 635 P.2d 103, 106–07 (Wash.
1981) (certified question from the Ninth Circuit United States Court of Appeals).
62. U.C.C. § 1-103(b); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(1) & cmt. b (1981)
(providing authority for the application of estoppel principles to the statute of frauds).
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C. Parol Evidence Rule
One issue that was debated at some length is the evidentiary effect of a merger clause. Endless discussions ensued about the various but contradictory merits
of adopting either a rule that merger clauses are mere presumptions or that they
should be treated as conclusive. The discussions brought much heat and very little light. The committee took the enlightened view that the Code should not answer this question, and that it should (as it had in the past) be left to the sound
discretion of the courts. This is a sound decision and one that could not be amplified in any useful way by PEB commentary.
D. Express Warranties & Non-Privity Buyers
The amendments proposed major changes to the law of express warranties. The
purpose of these changes was to accomplish two goals: to bring the disparate
rules that govern non-privity into uniformity and to handle the question of the statute of limitations for remedial promises. As discussed above, the issue of the
statute of limitations with remedial promises might be resolved with PEB commentary. This is not the case for the rights of non-privity buyers.
Article 2, by its terms, limits claims to sellers and buyers that are in privity of
contract.63 Although § 2-318 provides some claims by third party beneficiaries, 64
it does not provide for direct actions against non-privity sellers. Irrespective, a
significant number of courts have provided for actions by buyers against
non-privity sellers or manufacturers. Court vary in how they provide for the nonprivity claims. Some courts use (or misuse) § 2-318, and some courts simply allow direct action claims. There is no consistency among the courts on how far to
extend non-privity claims. Some courts allow claims for both express and implied warranties, 65 while other courts limit the claims to either express 66 or implied67 warranties. Moreover, the non-privity claim may be limited to the types of
damages the buyer seeks.68
63. U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
64. U.C.C. § 2-318.
65. For example, Delaware does not require privity for either express or implied warranties. Guinan v.
A.I. DuPont Hospital for Children, 597 F. Supp. 2d 485 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
66. This is the law in California, New York, Indiana, and Florida. See Grossman v. Schell & Kampeter,
Inc., 98 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 419 (E.D. Cal. 2019); Cummings v. FCA U.S. LLC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 288
(N.D.N.Y. 2019); Mahoney v. Endo Health Solutions, Inc., 90 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 135 (S.D.N.Y. July 20,
2016); Jackson v. Eddy’s LI RV Ctr., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Lautzenhiser v. Coloplast
A/S, 78 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 712 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2012); Jovine v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 1331
(S.D. Fla. 2011). New York allows non-privity implied warranty claims if the damages are for personal injury.
Bristol Vill., Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 916 F. Supp. 2d 357 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2012); Cereo v. Takigawa Kogyo Co., 676 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365–66 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
67. Montich v. Miele USA, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 2d 439, 453–54 (D.N.J. 2012). New Jersey law permits a
remote purchaser in the chain of commerce to recover under an implied warranty. See Nelson v. Xacta 3000
Inc., 71 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 729 (D.N.J. May 12, 2010).
68. For example, Vermont allows non-privity actions for personal injury but not for purely economic
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For express warranties, the revisions attempted to clear up the inconsistent
treatment of non-privity claims by providing for non-privity claims in two circumstances. First, this would occur when the warranty was contained “in a record
packaged with or accompanying the goods”.69 In other words, this obligation
would be created by the non-privity seller when the terms were in a record contained with the goods—the “warranty in the box.”
Second, the non-privity express warranty would run to the buyer if the express warranty was made “in an advertisement or a similar communication to the
public,” and the remote purchaser purchases the goods “with knowledge of and
with the expectation that the goods will conform to the [express warranty].” 70 In
other words, this obligation would arise from advertisements to users when the
user is aware of the advertisement and has reason to believe the seller is actually
promising something.
Because the revisions attempted to achieve by statute what courts had done
(albeit inconsistently) by case law, PEB commentary alone would not be able to
replicate the suggested revisions. Moreover, although the proposed revisions
were seller friendly,71 this part of the revisions received substantial objections by
industry. With that level of opposition, any attempt to provide clarity in PEB
commentary would likely be viewed as non-neutral.

losses. H. Hirschmann, LTD. v. Green Mt. Glass, LLC, 90 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 328 (D. Vt. 2016). Michigan
law recognizes the availability of an implied warranty claim against a remote seller or manufacturer for economic loss. See Sullivan Indus., Inc. v. Double Seal Glass Co., 192 Mich. App. 333, 341–45 (1991) (remote
manufacturer of sealant used in production of doors and windows subject to claim of implied warranty under
UCC).
69. U.C.C. § 2-313A(3) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
70. U.C.C. § 2-313B(3) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
71. By statutorily limiting non-privity express warranty-type obligations to those contained in the packaging of the goods or made by advertisements, the drafters attempted to achieve both logically coherent results
as well as national uniformity in the application for non-privity express warranties by providing only for those
claims that non-privity sellers should necessarily be responsible for, as the claims are based on information that
the sellers specifically provide for the targeted users.
The drafters thought it fair and reasonable to allow non-privity buyers to have a claim based on their reasonable
expectations for several reasons: (1) the express obligations are directed toward specific users, (2) the content
and the ability to exclude these obligations are fully within the power of the non-privity seller, and (3) nonprivity buyers’ expectations are created by the sellers with the intent to target the buyers who rely on this information. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313A (5) (a), 2-313B (5) (a) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
Given that the obligations created in the amended §§ 2-313A and 2-313B do not increase the obligations nonprivity sellers already have, combined with the express right to limit these obligations, the drafters thought that
manufacturers would be in support of these changes. This was not the case:
The new rule is a major change that conflicts with the direction of most recent court and legislative action. It
creates liability for public communications, even though the communication was not a part of the agreement
and even if it did not cause personal injury. The rule may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. In
any event, this is a contract statute and should deal with contracts. This rule is a huge step backward that invites
class action litigation and is outside the domain of a commercial contract law. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., Industry Concerns About Final Article 2 Revisions (2005) (on file with author).
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E. Implied Warranties
A proposed official comment to amended § 2-314 provided, “[w]hen recovery is sought for injury to person or property, whether goods are merchantable is
to be determined by applicable state products liability law.”72 This comment,
which was a holdover from the 1999 revisions, was a response to the line of cases, such as Denny v. Ford Motor Co., that holds that the standard for merchantability under Article 2 was based on a different standard than what constituted defectiveness under tort law.73
Note that the comment only suggests using the same contract and tort standard for personal injury and property damages, but not for other harms. If there
were a principled analytical basis for conflating the two standards, then there
would be no reason to limit this to the type of damages suffered. The comment was
never intended to be an objective policy choice, but a political compromise to appease detractors of the revisions. Whether the comment would have been followed
by courts that would have otherwise followed the Denny analysis will never be
known. This proposed comment will thankfully simply be lost in history.
Although Denny is obviously correct, the standard of “defective products” in
tort law is not the same standard as “merchantability” in Article 2. As noted
above, courts are divided on this issue. 74 Although I would have a personal preference for PEB commentary to affirm the Denny line of cases, it is unlikely that
such a contentious issue is appropriate for the PEB to undertake.
F. Warranty Disclaimers
The substantive proposed revisions to § 2-316 on warranty disclaimers and
modifications were limited to changes in the language necessary to create a safe
harbor disclaimer. 75 The intent was to make the language of disclaimers more

72. U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 7 (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011). State products liability law means tort
products liability law. Since products liability law includes breach of warranty actions under the U.C.C., if the
comment was read to include both contract and tort claims, it would be meaningless.
73. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 736 (N.Y. 1995); Castro v. QVC Network, Inc., 139
F.3d 114, 118 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1998). But see, e.g., Morrison’s Cafeteria v. Haddox, 431 So.2d 969, 973 (Ala.
1983) (holding the standards for merchantability and defective product in tort are the same) (citing Matthews v.
Campbell Soup Co., 380 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D. Tex. 1974)).
74. See supra note 73.
75. Under the amendments, to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability in a consumer contract,
the disclaimer would need to be in a record, be conspicuous, and include the following language: “The seller
undertakes no responsibility for the quality of the goods except as otherwise provided in this contract.” U.C.C. §
2-316(2) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011). To disclaim the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in a consumer contract, the disclaimer must be in a record, be conspicuous, and use the following language: “The seller assumes no responsibility that the goods will be fit for any particular purpose for which you
may be buying these goods, except as otherwise provided in this contract.” Id. A consumer contract was defined
as a “contract between a merchant seller and a consumer.” U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(d) (amended 2003) (withdrawn
2011). Consumer is defined as an individual who buys or contracts to buy goods “primarily for personal, family,
or household purposes.” U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
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readily understandable. Enactment of these changes would require changes in
many form contracts, and therefore places a burden on sellers to make the changes. The amendments would not, however, have increased or decreased the seller’s
responsibility.76 Language requirements for statutory compliance cannot be
changed by commentary. The revisions to the section on warranty disclaimers is
not appropriate for the list of possible issues for PEB commentary.
G. Remedies
The amendments made a series of changes in the remedies provisions. As
discussed above, the result of some of the changes could be accomplished by
PEB commentary and are not contentious. However, other proposed changes,
although reflecting current business practices, were based on statutory requirements of compliance, and therefore could not be accommodated by explanatory
commentary.77
Proposing a new substantive framework for seller’s damages, amended § 2710 provided for seller consequential damages in a non-consumer contract. This
minor change required a change in the language of the section, a result that could
not be accommodated by commentary, although courts often reach this result on
the current Code. Courts have been inclined to read the absence of consequential
damages in § 2-710 as the intent of the drafters to affirmatively exclude them; 78
the bulk of consequential damages that a seller would suffer is lost profits, for
which § 2-708(2) already provides an adequate measure of damages.79 Moreover,
the courts have been apt to find what are in effect a seller’s consequential damages
as incidental damages, and therefore have allowed these damages to sneak in the
back door.80 This is also a risk that parties can easily eliminate by contract.
The amendments also changed § 2-713—as to the time to measure the buyer’s damages—from the time the buyer learned of the breach to the time of ten76. Compare U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (requiring conspicuous language to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability), with U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011) (requiring inclusion of the
statement: “The seller undertakes no responsibility for the quality of the goods except as otherwise provided in
this contract”).
77. Thus, for example, the time to demand reclamation of goods under amended § 2-702 is changed from
“ten days” to “a reasonable time.” See U.C.C. § 2-702(2) & cmt. 2 (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011). This
provides the needed flexibility for a seller who does not discover the buyer’s insolvency until after the ten-day
period. The amendments also broaden the ability of a seller under § 2-705 to stop delivery by eliminating the
requirement that goods be by the “carload, truckload, planeload or larger shipments of express or freight.”
Compare U.C.C. § 2-705(1) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011), with U.C.C. § 2-705(1). This change recognized the different modes of delivery that are currently used.
78. See, e.g., Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 1980); Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., Petrobras v. Am. Oil Corp., 372 F. Supp. 503, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
79. U.C.C. § 2-708(2).
80. See, e.g., N. Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Direct Mail Specialist, 697 F. Supp. 163, 166 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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der.81 This change reflects the recognition of the oddity of the current law.82 The
current standard suggests three problems. First, unlike the question of when tender was supposed to occur, determining when a buyer “learns of a breach” creates a difficult evidentiary question. Second, with no explanation, this section differs from the seller’s concomitant provision, which is based on the time tender
was to occur; this latter standard being consistent with the common law. 83 Third,
the amendments properly recognize the underlying basis for measuring damages
based on the time and place where the goods are to be tendered, as this reflects
the ex ante bargain the parties made. As a contractual purist, I think this change
is an improvement in the law. The current § 2-713, however, has not really
caused problems, and certainly the current stature cannot be ignored by inconsistent PEB commentary.
H. Statute of Limitations
The current provision on statute of limitations suffers one major drawback—
it is inflexible. It attempts to handle multiple questions with what is primarily a
single standard. Subject to the parties’ ability to alter the limitation period either
by limiting it to one year84 or by extending it with the seller’s promise of future
performance,85 the limitation period is four years from the time the goods are
tendered to the buyer.86 The amendments addressed some of the perceived failures of the current law by providing different limitation periods for a variety of
different types of breach. Specifically, the amendments provided specific accrual
rules for breach by repudiation,87 breach of a remedial promise,88 breach of the
81. Compare U.C.C. § 2-713(1) (stating that the market price for damages is determined “when the buyer
learned of the breach”), with U.C.C. § 2-713(1) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011) (stating that the market price
for damages is evaluated no later than at the time for tender).
82. It could well have been that the drafters of the current text assumed that by measuring damages at the
time the buyer learned of the breach, the most common situation where the breach would occur is in the case of
an anticipatory repudiation. If this is the case, it seems that the drafters were assuming that an anticipatory repudiation should be the default position instead of an exception to the general rule. Recognizing this, and assuming that an anticipatory repudiation is the exception and not the rule, the amendments provide a special damage
rule for buyers where there is an anticipatory repudiation: measure the market price of goods in the case of an
anticipatory repudiation “at the expiration of a commercially reasonable time after the buyer learned of the repudiation.” U.C.C. § 2-713(1)(b) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011). There was a concomitant change in the
rules for sellers: damages for goods in the case of an anticipatory repudiation are measured “at the expiration of
a commercially reasonable time after the seller learned of the repudiation.” U.C.C. § 2-708(1)(b) (amended
2003) (withdrawn 2011). The contrary provision in § 2-723 was deleted. U.C.C. § 2-723 (amended 2003)
(withdrawn 2011).
83. Compare U.C.C. § 2-708(1)(a) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011) (seller’s damages are measured at
the time of tender),
with U.C.C. § 2-713(1)(a) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011) (buyer’s damages are measured at the time buyer
learns of the breach).
84. U.C.C. § 2-725(1).
85. U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
86. U.C.C. § 2-725(1).
87. U.C.C. § 2-725(2)(b) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
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warranty of title and non-infringement,89 and breach of a non-privity obligation.90
While all of these changes are improvements in the law, none of these specific
situations have caused serious problems in the cases, with the exception of remedial promises.91
The amendments also provided that the limitation period cannot be reduced
from less than the default period of four years in a consumer contract. 92 This apparent consumer protection change actually would have very little practical impact on buyer’s rights, as the seller is still able to restrict the time of any express
or implied warranty and therefore not increase the time risk for the goods. As
with the other amendments in the limitation periods, the lack of this change is not
likely to have serious consequences. Thus, most of the proposed changes to the
statute of limitations, although useful and not subject to a workaround by the
PEB, were only useful clarifications for a minority of cases but whose absence is
not a major loss.93
IX. CONCLUSION
It is too early to predict whether the PEB will actually address any of the issues posed by the proposed revisions to Article 2. The first step has been taken;
the PEB is studying the proposed revisions for possible commentary. Whether
this actually moves to the next step of articulating specific issues is yet to be
seen. If the PEB does move forward, I suggest that several of the issues I have
addressed in this article may be the basis for that commentary.

88. U.C.C. § 2-725(2)(c) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
89. U.C.C. § 2-725(3)(d) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
90. U.C.C. § 2-725(3)(c) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
91. As discussed above, the statute of limitations for remedial promises might be resolved by PEB commentary that provides guidance on the distinction between U.C.C. obligations and remedial promises as freestanding contractual obligations not subject to Article 2’s statute of limitations. Supra Section III.C.
92. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011).
93. The one change that could have had an impact was the propose extension of the statute of limitations
when the when the time of discover was after the time of tender. The limitation period of four years from the
time of tender assumes that the breach occurs when the goods are tendered. It has long been questioned whether
the limitation period should begin then, even if it is unreasonable for the buyer to discover the breach at that
time. The amendments responded to this by providing that the limitation period could also be “one year after the
breach was or should have been discovered, but no longer than five years after the right of action accrued.”
U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (amended 2003) (withdrawn 2011). This was a compromise. It provided some relief for the
buyer who does not discover the breach until after delivery, but also set some limit (five years) on the amount of
time a seller would have to be concerned about litigation on goods after the sale. Although an improvement
over existing law, the loss of this extension of the four-year period is not likely to be a source of problems in
many cases.
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When a contract is breached, both U.S. and U.K. law provide that the nonbreaching party should be made whole. The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”)
provides that “[t]he remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed.”1 The English version, going back to Robinson v.
Harman, is “that where a party sustains a loss by reason of breach of contract, he
is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to
damages, as if the contract had been performed.”2 I propose a general principle
that should guide implementation—the contract is an asset and the problem is
one of determining the change in value of that asset at the time of the breach.
In the simplest case—i.e., the breach of a contract for the sale of a
commodity in a thick market—the change in the value of the asset is simply the
contract-market differential; the contract-as-asset notion does not add much. It
becomes more useful as we move away from that extreme—e.g., imperfect
substitutes, future deliveries, or long-term contracts. Thus, for example, it makes
little sense to talk of the contract-market differential if the buyer repudiated a 20year take-or-pay contract in the third year.
Two caveats. First, I am referring only to direct damages: what are the
damages if one of the parties does not go through with the transaction?
Consequential damages and breach of warranty raise different questions. 3
Second, the damage rule should be viewed as the price of the option to terminate.
* Jerome L. Greene Professor of Transactional Law, Emeritus, Columbia Law School. Email:
vpg@law.columbia.edu
1. U.C.C. § 1-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
2. (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 363.
3. For my analyses of consequential damages, see VICTOR GOLDBERG, RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW
AND CONTRACT DESIGN 87–133 (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2015) and VICTOR GOLDBERG, RETHINKING
THE LAW OF CONTRACT DAMAGES 165–227 (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2019). In both countries, courts
have blurred the line between direct and consequential damages. See GOLDBERG, RETHINKING THE LAW OF
CONTRACT DAMAGES, supra at 165–98.
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